In this article, Savage’s theory of decision-making under uncertainty is extended from a classical environment into a non-classical one. The Boolean lattice of events is replaced by an arbitrary ortho-complemented poset. We formulate the corresponding axioms and provide representation theorems for qualitative measures and expected utility. Then, we discuss the issue of beliefs updating and investigate a transition probability model. An application to a simple game context is proposed.

Quantum cognition in decision making is a recent and rapidly growing field. In this paper, we develop an expected utility theory in a context of non-classical uncertainty. We replace the classical state space with a Hilbert space which allows introducing the concept of quantum lottery. Within that framework, we formulate axioms on preferences over quantum lotteries to establish a representation theorem. We show that demanding the consistency of choice behavior conditional on new information is equivalent to the von Neumann–Lüders postulate (...) applied to beliefs. A dynamically consistent quantum-like agent may violate dynamic recursive consistency, however. This feature suggests interesting applications in behavioral economics as we illustrate in an example of persuasion. (shrink)

The essays in this volume are based on addresses presented during a colloquium on free logic, modal logic and related areas held at the University of California at Irvine, in May of 1968. With the single exception of Dagfinn F011esdal, whose revised address is included in a recent issue of Synthese honoring W. V. Quine, all of the speakers at the Irvine colloquium are contributors to this volume. Thanks are due to Professor A. I. Melden, Chairman of the Department of (...) Philosophy at Irvine, for his enthusiastic support of the colloquium, and to Drs. Gordon Brittan and Daniel Dennett for their help in the administration of the colloquium. Finally. I should also like to thank Professor Ralph W. Gerard, Dean of the Graduate Division of the University of California at Irvine, for the financial support which made the colloquium possible. KAREL LAMBERT Laguna Beach, California, 1969 TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE V KAREL LAMBERT and BAS C. VAN FRAASSEN/ Meaning Relations, Possible Objects, and Possible Worlds 1 JAAKKO HINTIKKA / Existential Presuppositions and Uniqueness Presuppositions 20 RICHMOND H. THOMASON / Some Completeness Results for Modal Predicate Calculi 56 H. LEBLANC and R. K. MEYER / Truth-Value Semantics for the Theory of Types 77 J. M. VICKERS / Probability and Non Standard Logics 102 PETER W. WOODRUFF / Logic and Truth Value Gaps 121 DANA SCOTT / Advice on Modal Logic 143 INDEX OF NAMES 175 KAREL LAMBER T AND BAS C. (shrink)

Review the Istvan Kiraly V.'s book: Death and History.

Perruchet & Vinter (P&V) claim that all mental representations are conscious and that the cognitive unconscious does not exist. Unfortunately, support for these claims is garnered illicitly, by defining the terms representation and computation in a way that is unduly restrictive and misleading. In addition, their proposals fail to engage adequately with critically important evidence and theory from neuropsychology concerning consciousness and cognition.

The essays in this volume are based on addresses presented during a colloquium on free logic, modal logic and related areas held at the University of California at Irvine, in May of 1968. With the single exception of Dagfinn F011esdal, whose revised address is included in a recent issue of Synthese honoring W. V. Quine, all of the speakers at the Irvine colloquium are contributors to this volume. Thanks are due to Professor A. I. Melden, Chairman of the Department of (...) Philosophy at Irvine, for his enthusiastic support of the colloquium, and to Drs. Gordon Brittan and Daniel Dennett for their help in the administration of the colloquium. Finally. I should also like to thank Professor Ralph W. Gerard, Dean of the Graduate Division of the University of California at Irvine, for the financial support which made the colloquium possible. KAREL LAMBERT Laguna Beach, California, 1969 TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE V KAREL LAMBERT and BAS C. VAN FRAASSEN/ Meaning Relations, Possible Objects, and Possible Worlds 1 JAAKKO HINTIKKA / Existential Presuppositions and Uniqueness Presuppositions 20 RICHMOND H. THOMASON / Some Completeness Results for Modal Predicate Calculi 56 H. LEBLANC and R. K. MEYER / Truth-Value Semantics for the Theory of Types 77 J. M. VICKERS / Probability and Non Standard Logics 102 PETER W. WOODRUFF / Logic and Truth Value Gaps 121 DANA SCOTT / Advice on Modal Logic 143 INDEX OF NAMES 175 KAREL LAMBER T AND BAS C. (shrink)

L'analyse d'une cinétique de croissance y est conduite à partir du modèle logistique généralisé de Richards-Nelder. On distingue 2 types de processus dits mono- et multi-logistique. Dans le cas mono-logistique, le phénomène est correctement décrit par une seule fonction logistique. La cinétique de croissance est alors caractérisée par lea propriétés de chacune des phases G 1 à G 4, délimitées par les points singuliers Γmax, V max et Γmin. On appelle structure de croissance la contribution relative de ces différentes phases (...) à l'expression de la croissance totale. Cette distribution temporelle de l'activité de croissance est une représentation discrétisée de la trajectoire y 0 → y max. On appelle processus multi-logistique toute cinétique de croissance correspondant à une somme de 2 ou plusieurs logistiques généralisées. II existe alors un plus grand nombre de points singuliers et donc un plus grand nombre de phases G i que dans le cas monologistique. La structure de croissance définit avec précision la cinetique du phénomène, ainsi que l'importance relative des différentes composantes logistiques au cours du temps. Une application en est donnée avec le grandissement des cellules pleuridiophores de l'Algue Antithamnion plumula. L'allongement de ces cellules est toujours de type bi-logistique. Les caractéristiques de la structure de croissance permettent une discrimination nette du sporophyte et des gametophytes mâle et femelle. Tandis que la composante 1 est pen différente, la composante 2 varie fortement selon la ploïdie du thalle. En revanche, il y a pen de différences entre les deux gamétophytes. Cette notion de structure de croissance est ainsi susceptible d'apporter des résultats originaux. Audelà de cet example, cette approche est proposée comme une méthode de caractérisation simple mais précise de toute cinétique de croissance basée sur lea variations temporelles de l'activité de croissance [couple ]. (shrink)

MEDIEVAL LOGICS LAMBERT MARIE DE RIJK (ed.), Die mittelalterlichen Traktate De mod0 opponendiet respondendi, Einleitung und Ausgabe der einschlagigen Texte. (Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Neue Folge Band 17.) Miinster: Aschendorff, 1980. 379 pp. No price stated. THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY MARTA FATTORI, Lessico del Novum Organum di Francesco Bacone. Rome: Edizioni dell'Ateneo 1980. Two volumes, il + 543, 520 pp. Lire 65.000. VIVIAN SALMON, The study of language in 17th century England. (Amsterdam Studies in the (...) Theory and History of Linguistic Science, Series 111: Studies in theHistory of Linguistics, Volume 17.) Amsterdam: John Benjamins B.V., 1979.x + 218 pp. Dfl. 65. Theoria cum Praxi. Zum Verhaltnis von Theorie und Praxis im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert. (Akten des 111. Internationalen Leibnizkongress, Hannover, 12. bis 17.November 1977, Band 111: Logik, Erkenntnistheorie, Wissenschaftstheorie, Metaphysik, Theologie.) Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1980. vii + 269 pp. DM 48. CLASSICAL AND NON-CLASSICAL LOGICS MICHAEL CLARK, The place of syllogistic in logical theory. Nottingham: University of Nottingham Press, 1980. ix + 151 pp. £3.00. A.F. PARKER-RHODES, The theory of indistinguishables. Dordrecht, Boston and London: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1981. xvii + 216 pp. Dfl.90.00/$39.50. NICHOLAS RESCHER and ROBERT BRANDOM, The logic of inconsistency. Oxford:Basil Blackwell, 1980. x + 174 pp. f 11.50. MISCELLANEOUS J. ZELENY, The logic of Marx. Translated from the German by T. Carver. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980. xcii + 247 pp. £12.50. FELIX KAUFMANN, The infinite in mathematics. Edited by Brian McGuinness. Introduction by E. Nagel. Translation from the German by Paul Foulkes. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978. xvii + 235 pp. Dfl 85/$39.50 (cloth); Dfl 45/$19.95 (paper). PAMELA MCCORDUCK, Machines who think. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1979. xiv + 275 pp. $14.95. J. MITTELSTRASS (ed.), Enzyklopadie Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie Bd. 1 : A-G. Mannheim, Wien, Ziirich: Bibliographisches Institut, 1980. 835 pp. DM 128. (shrink)

Part I: The Life of Cognitive Science:. William Bechtel, Adele Abrahamsen, and George Graham. Part II: Areas of Study in Cognitive Science:. 1. Analogy: Dedre Gentner. 2. Animal Cognition: Herbert L. Roitblat. 3. Attention: A.H.C. Van Der Heijden. 4. Brain Mapping: Jennifer Mundale. 5. Cognitive Anthropology: Charles W. Nuckolls. 6. Cognitive and Linguistic Development: Adele Abrahamsen. 7. Conceptual Change: Nancy J. Nersessian. 8. Conceptual Organization: Douglas Medin and Sandra R. Waxman. 9. Consciousness: Owen Flanagan. 10. Decision Making: J. Frank Yates (...) and Paul A. Estin. 11. Emotions: Paul E. Griffiths. 12. Imagery and Spatial Representation: Rita E. Anderson. 13. Language Evolution and Neuromechanisms: Terrence W. Deacon. 14. Language Processing: Kathryn Bock and Susan M. Garnsey. 15. Linguistics Theory: D. Terence Langendoen. 16. Machine Learning: Paul Thagard. 17. Memory: Henry L. Roediger III and Lyn M. Goff. 18. Perception: Cees Van Leeuwen. 19. Perception: Color: Austen Clark. 20. Problem Solving: Kevin Dunbar. 21. Reasoning: Lance J. Rips. 22. Social Cognition: Alan J. Lambert and Alison L. Chasteen. 23. Unconscious Intelligence: Rhianon Allen and Arthur S. Reber. 24. Understanding Texts: Art Graesser and Pam Tipping. 25. Word Meaning: Barbara C. Malt. Part III: Methodologies of Cognitive Science:. 26. Artificial Intelligence: Ron Sun. 27. Behavioral Experimentation: Alexander Pollatsek and Keith Rayner. 28. Cognitive Ethology: Marc Bekoff. 29. Deficits and Pathologies: Christopher D. Frith. 30. Ethnomethodology: Barry Saferstein. 31. Functional Analysis: Brian Macwhinney. 32. Neuroimaging: Randy L. Buckner and Steven E. Petersen. 33. Protocal Analysis: K. Anders Ericsson. 34. Single Neuron Electrophysiology: B. E. Stein, M.T. Wallace, and T.R. Stanford. 35. Structural Analysis: Robert Frank. Part IV: Stances in Cognitive Science:. 36. Case-based Reasoning: David B. Leake. 37. Cognitive Linguistics: Michael Tomasello. 38. Connectionism, Artificial Life, and Dynamical Systems: Jeffrey L. Elman. 39. Embodied, Situated, and Distributed Cognition: Andy Clark. 40. Mediated Action: James V. Wertsch. 41. Neurobiological Modeling: P. Read Montague and Peter Dayan. 42. Production Systems: Christian D. Schunn and David Klahr. Part V: Controversies in Cognitive Science:. 43. The Binding Problem: Valerie Gray Hardcastle. 44. Heuristics and Satisficing: Robert C. Richardson. 45. Innate Knowledge: Barbara Landau. 46. Innateness and Emergentism: Elizabeth Bates, Jeffrey L. Elman, Mark H. Johnson, Annette Karmiloff-Smith, Domenico Parisi, and Kim Plunkett. 47. Intentionality: Gilbert Harman. 48. Levels of Explanation and Cognition Architectures: Robert N. McCauley. 49. Modularity: Irene Appelbaum. 50. Representation and Computation: Robert S. Stufflebeam. 51. Representations: Dorrit Billman. 52. Rules: Terence Horgan and John Tienson. 53. Stage Theories Refuted: Donald G. Mackay. Part VI: Cognitive Science in the Real World:. 54. Education: John T. Bruer. 55. Ethics: Mark L. Johnson. 56. Everyday Life Environments: Alex Kirlik. 57. Institutions and Economics: Douglass C. North. 58. Legal Reasoning: Edwina L. Rissland. 59. Mental Retardation: Norman W. Bray, Kevin D. Reilly, Lisa F. Huffman, Lisa A. Grupe, Mark F. Villa, Kathryn L. Fletcher, and Vivek Anumolu. 60. Science: William F. Brewer and Punyashloke Mishra. Selective Biographies of Major Contributors to Cognitive Science: William Bechtel and Tadeusz Zawidzki. (shrink)

This article, prompted by an extended essay published in the Journal of Medical Ethics by Charles Foster, and the current controversy surrounding the case of Vincent Lambert, analyses the legal and ethical arguments in relation to the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from patients with prolonged disorders of consciousness. The article analyses the legal framework through the prism of domestic law, case-law of the European Court of Human Rights and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and examines (...) the challenge to the ethical consensus made by Foster. It concludes that the right approach remains a version of the approach that has prevailed for the last 25 years since the decision in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland[1993] AC 789, refined to reflect that that there is now, and rightly, a much more limited place for judgments made about the ‘burden’ of treatment or the quality of life enjoyed by the person made on the basis of assumptions about that person as a category as opposed to investigation of that person as an individual human being. (shrink)

The expression ‘free logic,’ coined by the author in 1960, is an abbreviation for ‘logic free of existence assumptions with respect to its terms, singular and general, but whose quantifiers are treated exactly as in standard quantifier logic.’ In more traditional language, such logics do not presume that either singular or general terms — the two distinct categories of terms emphasized in modern logical grammar — have existential import. A singular term ‘t’ has existential import just in case t exists (...) (or, equivalently, there exists an object the same as t) and a general term (or predicate) ‘G’ has existential import just in case G exist (or, equivalently, there exists an object that is G).1 Examples from colloquial English customarily taken to be singular terms are expressions such as ‘Socrates’, ‘the planet causing perturbations in the orbit of Mercury’, ‘5’, ‘5/0’, ‘the square of 3’ and ‘having a heart’. Some of these do not have existential import — in particular, ‘5/0’ and ‘the planet causing perturbations in the orbit of Mercury’. Examples from colloquial English customarily taken to be general terms are expressions such as ‘is a philosopher’, ‘is a planet causing perturbations in the orbit of Mercury’, ‘number’, ‘is divisible by 0’, and ‘has a heart’. Some of these general terms do not have existential import — in particular, ‘is a planet causing perturbations in the orbit of Mercury’ and ‘is divisible by 0’. To say that the quantifers are treated exactly as in standard quantifier logic is to say, roughly, that the operator symbol ‘∃’ (the existential quantifier) reads: ‘There exists an object’, and the operator symbol ‘∀’ (the universal quantifier) reads: ‘Every existent object’. (shrink)

As well as aiming to revive interest in Meinong's thought, this book challenges many of the most widespread assumptions of philosophical logic.

The present volume is a product of an international research program 'Foundations of Science and Ethics', launched in 1976 by the Inter University Centre of Post-Graduate Studies, Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia, with the financial support of the V olkswagen Foundation. According to the outline ofthe program, formulated in 1976 by a committee consisting of Professors Dagfinn F~llesdal, Rudolf Haller (coordinator), Lorenz Kruger, Karel Lambert, Keith Lehrer, Kuno Lorenz, Gunther Patzig, Ivan Supek and Paul Weingartner, its general purpose was to investigate the (...) interplay of various internal and external factors in the development of science. Generous financial support from the Volkswagen Foundation made it possible to plan four annual conferences, the first of which was held in Dubrovnik on March 6-12, 1978. This volume contains the majority of the papers presented in the first Dubrovnik conference; the main theme of this conference was 'Rationality in Science and Ethics' (Some of the papers appear here in a thoroughly revised form. ) Further results of the research program will be discussed in three other conferences, to be held in Dubrovnik in 1979-1981; the papers presented in these conferences will be published separately. Professor Rudolf Haller of the University of Graz assumed the burden of the practical planning and organization of the first conference (as well as that of the other three conferences). I wish to thank Professor Haller on behalf of all participants for carrying out this demanding and time-consuming task. (shrink)

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Please find below the Bibliography in PDF format for Who's Afraid of Deleuze and Guattari? Whors"s Afraid of Del.

The essay outlines the character of free logic, and motivation for its construction and development. It details some technical achievements of high philosophical interest, but urges that the role of existence assumptions in logic is still not fully understood, that unresolved old problems, both technical and philosophical, abound, and presents some new problems of considerable philosophical import in free logic.

At the outset of an ethnographic inquiry, we navigated national and international resources to search for theoretical and practical guidance on obtaining parents and children’s informed consent/assent. While much theoretical guidance debating ethical issues to children’s participation in research was found, a paucity of published papers offering practical guidance on assent processes and/or visual representations of child assent forms and information sheets was discovered. The purpose of this article is to describe our experiences, both theoretically and practically, of negotiating the (...) process of obtaining informed consent and assent with parents and children for a non-therapeutic qualitative research study. We hope this article instigates a platform for others to explicate their experience and contributes to the construction of a coherent body of knowledge which will clearly delineate important elements that must be considered when negotiating children’s agreement to participate in research. (shrink)

This thesis argues that theists can and should be expressivists about morality.

The authors contend that most contemporary logic textbooks fail the average student because they emphasize the evaluation of arguments over their clarification, assuming that the student already understands what motivations underlie logic.